FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

The federal securities laws consist mainly of eight statutes:

Securities Act of 1933 (SA)
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA)
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA)
Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA)
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA)
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA)

We first summarize what each of the laws covers to provide an overview of the pattern of legislation. We then develop some of the more important provisions in greater detail. The early major acts were enacted beginning in 1933. There is a reason for the timing. The stock market crash of 1929 was followed by continued depressed markets for several years. Because so many investors lost money, both houses of Congress conducted lengthy hearings to find the causes and the culprits. The hearings were marked by sensationalism and wide publicity. The securities acts of 1933 and 1934 were the direct outgrowth of the congressional hearings.

The Securities Act of 1933 regulates the sale of securities to the public. It provides for the registration of public offerings of securities to establish a record of representations. All participants involved in preparing the registration statements are subject to legal liability for any mis-statement of facts or omissions of vital information.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to administer the securities laws and to regulate practices in the purchase and sale of securities.

The purpose of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was to correct abuses in the financing and operation of electric and gas public utility holding company systems and to bring about simplification of the corporate structures and physical integration of the operating properties. The SEC’s responsibilities under the act of 1935 were substantially completed by the 1950s.

The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 applies to public issues of debt securities with a value of $5 million or more. Debt issues represent a form of promissory note associated with a long document setting out the terms of a complex contract and referred to as the indenture. The 1939 act sets forth the responsibilities of the indenture trustee (often a commercial bank) and specifies requirements to be included in the indenture (bond contract) for the protection of the bond purchasers. In September 1987, the SEC recommended to Congress a number of amendments to establish new conflict-of-interest standards for indenture trustees and to recognize new developments in financing techniques.

The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates publicly owned companies engaged in the business of investing and trading in securities. Investment companies are subject to rules formulated and enforced by the SEC. The act of 1940 was amended in 1970 to place additional controls on management compensation and sales charges.

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended in 1960, provides for registration and regulation of investment advisers, as the name suggests.

The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, (SIPCO). This corporation is empowered to supervise the liquidation of bankrupt securities firms and to arrange for payments to their customers.

The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 were passed after 4 years of research and investigation into the changing nature of securities markets. The study recommended the abolition of fixed minimum brokerage commissions. It called for increased automation of trading by utilizing data processing technology to link markets. The SEC was mandated to work with the securities industry to develop an effective national market system to achieve the goal of nationwide competition in securities trading with centralized reporting of price quotations and transactions. It proposed a central order routing system to find the best available price.

In 1978, the SEC began to streamline the securities registration process. Large, well-known corporations were permitted to abbreviate registration statements and to disclose information by reference to other documents that already had been made public. Before these changes, the registration process often required at least several weeks. After the 1978 changes, a registration statement could be approved in as little as 2 days.

In March 1982, Rule 415 provided for shelf registration. Large corporations can register the full amount of debt or equity they plan to sell over a 2-year period. After the initial registration has been completed, the firm can sell up to the specified amount of debt or equity without further delay. The firm can choose the time when the funds are needed or when market conditions appear favorable. Shelf registration has been actively used in the sale of bonds, with as much as 60% of debt sales utilizing shelf registration. Less than 10% of the total issuance of equities have employed shelf registration.

In 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was enacted by Congress. This law placed restrictions on the filing of securities fraud class action suits. It sought to discourage the filing of frivolous claims. In late 1998, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) was signed into law. It had been found that some class action plaintiffs had been circumventing the PSLRA by filing suits in state courts. SLUSA establishes a uniform national standard to be applied to securities class actions and makes clear such suits will be the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. SLUSA forces all class action plaintiffs alleging securities fraud to provide greater detail on the basis for their claims. It enables defendant companies to delay the expenses of discovery of evidence until the complaint has withstood a motion to dismiss. The 1998 act seeks to protect companies against unfounded securities fraud class actions. This reduces the pressure on defendant companies to enter into a settlement to avoid the litigation expenses that otherwise would be incurred.

In the wake of the recent allegations of fraud, insider trading, and questionable accounting practices by large companies such as Adeiphia, Enron, Global Crossing, ImClone, Qwest, and Tyco, President Bush signed into law on July 31, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is expected to have a huge impact on corporate governance, financial disclosures, auditing standards, analyst reports, insider trading, and so forth. Observers view the Act as the most comprehensive reform of securities laws since the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The Act contains eleven titles:

I. Public Accounting Oversight Board
II. Auditor Independence
III. Corporate Responsibility
IV. Enhanced Financial Disclosures
V. Analyst Conflicts of Interest
VI. Commission Resources and Authority
VII. Studies and Reports
VIII. Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
IX. White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements
X. Corporate Tax Returns
XI. Corporate Fraud Accountability

Below is a brief summary of some of the Titles. Title I establishes a five member Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee audits, establish standards, and monitor registered public accounting firms. Title II requires auditor independence by prohibiting auditors from performing certain non-audit services contemporaneous with an audit, requires auditor rotation, and requires that auditors report detailed material to the audit committee. Title III strengthens corporate responsibility by requiring each member of the audit committee to be an independent member of the board, requires the CEO and CFO to certify financial reports, requires the CEO and CFO to forfeit bonus and compensation if an accounting restatement is due to non-compliance of the firm, and requires that attorneys appearing before the SEC to report violations of securities by a firm or its management. Title IV provides for greater financial disclosures such as requiring financial reports to reflect all material adjustments and off- balance sheet items, prohibits loans to executives, requires insiders to disclose insider trans actions within 2 business days of the transaction, and requires that at least one member of the audit committee be a financial expert. Title V attempts to separate analyst conflicts of interest by restricting the ability of investment bankers to pre-approve research reports, restricts employers from firing analysts for having written negative reports, and requires analysts to disclose any potential conflicts such as having owned stock in the company covered. Titles VIII, IX, and XI provide stringent penalties for corporate and financial fraud and other white-collar crimes by corporations and management.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act went through Congress at a rapid pace without any opposition in the Senate and minimal opposition in the House of Representatives. Subsequent to President Bush’s signing of the Act into law on July 31,2002, the SEC and the stock exchanges have been proposing and implementing rules in accordance with the Act. Some of the provisions were effective immediately, whereas in other cases, the SEC has 180 and 270 days, in some instances longer, to implement the rules. There is no question that the Act will have an enormous impact on corporate governance. However, since the timing is so recent, it remains to be seen as to the effectiveness of the Act in curtailing corporate and financial fraud and providing greater financial disclosure to investors, while at the same time not impeding corporations from maximizing profits on behalf of shareholders.

OFFER REGULATION – THE WILLIAMS ACT

Prior to the late 1960s, most inter-corporate combinations were represented by mergers. This typically involved friendly negotiations by two or more firms. When they mutually agreed, a combination of some form might occur. During the conglomerate merger movement of the 1960s, corporate takeovers began to occur. Some were friendly and not much different from mergers. Others were hostile and shook up the business community.

In October 1965, Senator Harrison Williams introduced legislation seeking to protect the target companies. These initial efforts failed, but his second effort, initiated in 1967, succeeded. The Williams Act, in the form of various amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, became law on July 29, 1968. Its stated purpose was to protect target shareholders from swift and secret takeovers in three ways: (1) by generating more information during the takeover process that target shareholders and management could use to evaluate outstanding offers; (2) by requiring a minimum period during which a tender offer must be held open, thus delaying the execution of the tender offer; and (3) by explicitly authorizing targets to sue bid ding firms.

SECTION 13

Section 13(d) of the Williams Act of 1968 required that any person who had acquired 10% or more of the stock of a public corporation must file a Schedule 13D with the SEC within 10 days of crossing the 10% threshold. The act was amended in 1970 to increase the SEC powers and to reduce the trigger point for the reporting obligation under Section 13(d) from 10% to 5%. Basically, Section 13(d) provides management and the shareholders with an early notification system.

The filing requirement does not apply to those persons who purchased less than 2% of the stock within the previous 12 months. Due to this exemption, a substantial amount of stock can be accumulated over several years without having to file Schedule 13D. Institutional investors (registered brokers and dealers, banks, insurance companies, and so forth) can choose to file Schedule 13G instead of Schedule 13D if the equity securities were acquired in the ordinary course of business. Schedule 13G is an abbreviated version of Schedule 13D.

The insider trading scandals of the late 1980s produced calls for a reduction below 5% and a shortening of the 10-day minimum period for filing. However, shortening the period would not stop the practice of “parking” violations that was uncovered in the Boesky investigation. Under parking arrangements, traders attempt to hide the extent of their ownership to avoid the 5% disclosure trigger by “parking” purchased securities with an accomplice broker until a later date. A related practice is to purchase options on the stock of the target: this is equivalent to ownership because the options can be exercised whenever the holder wishes to take actual ownership.

SECTION 14

Section 13(d) and 13(g) of the Williams Act apply to any large stock acquisitions, whether public or private (an offering to less than 25 people). Section 14(d) applies only to public tender offers but applies whether the acquisition is small or large, so its coverage is broader. The 5% trigger rule also applies under Section 14(d). Thus, any group making solicitations or recommendations to a target group of shareholders that would result in owning more than 5% of a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Act must first file a Schedule 14D with the SEC. An acquiring firm must disclose in a Tender Offer Statement (Schedule 14D-1) its intentions and business plans for the target as well as any relationships or agreements between the two firms. The schedule must be filed with the SEC “as soon as practicable on the date of the commencement of the tender offer”; copies must be hand delivered to the target firm and to any competitive bidders; and the relevant stock exchanges (or the National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD, for over-the-counter stocks) must be notified by telephone (followed by a mailing of the schedule).

Note, however, that the language of Section 14(d) refers to any group making recommendations to target shareholders. This includes target management, which is prohibited from advising target shareholders as to how to respond to a tender offer until it too has filed with the SEC. Until target management has filed a Schedule 14D-9, a Tender Offer Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, they may only advise shareholders to defer tendering their shares while management considers the offer. Companies that consider themselves vulnerable often take the precaution of preparing a fill-in-the-blanks schedule left with an agent in Washington to be filed immediately in the event of a takeover attempt, allowing target management to respond swiftly in making public recommendations to shareholders. Thus, Section 14(d) (1) provides the early notification system and information that will help target shareholders deter mine whether or not to tender their shares. SEA Sections 14(d) (4)—(7) regulate the terms of a tender offer, including the length of time the offer must be left open (20 trading days), the right shareholders to withdraw shares that they may have tendered previously, the manner in which tendered shares must be purchased in oversubscribed offers, and the effect of the bidder changing the terms of the offer. The delay period also gives shareholders time to evaluate the offer, but, more importantly, it enables management to seek competing bids.

Also, SEA Section 14(e) prohibits misrepresentation; nondisclosure; or any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.
INSIDER TRADING OVERVIEW

The SEC has three broad categories under which insider trading, fraud, or illegal profits can be attacked. Rule 10b-5 is a general prohibition against fraud or deceit in security transactions. Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading in nonpublic information in connection with tender offers. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 applies to insider trading more generally. It states that those who trade on information not available to the general public can be made to give back their illegal profits and pay a penalty of three times as much as their illegal activities produced. To date, the term insider trading has not been clearly delineated by the SEC. The ambiguity of the three sources of power that may be used by the SEC in the regulation of insider trading gives the SEC considerable discretion in its choice of practices and cases to prosecute. Also, the SEC is empowered to offer bounties to informants whose information leads to the recovery of illegal gains and payment of a civil penalty.

It should be noted also that the traditional regulation of insider trading was provided for under SEA Sections 16(a) and 16(b). Section 16(a) applies to officers, directors, and any persons who own 10% or more of any class of securities of a company. Section 16(a) provides that these corporate insiders must report to the SEC all transactions involving their purchase or sale of the corporation’s stock on a monthly basis. Section 16(a) is based on the premise that a corporate insider has an unfair advantage by virtue of his or her knowledge of information that is generated within the corporation. This information is available on a privileged basis because the insider is an officer, a director, or a major security holder who is presumed to have privileged communications with top officers in the company. Section 16(b) provides that the corporation or any of its security holders may bring suit against the offending corporate insider to return the profits to the corporation because of insider trading completed within a 6-month period.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended Section 1(a) of the 1934 Act by requiring that insiders disclose any changes in ownership within 2 business days of the transaction, sharply decreasing the time between the insider transaction and disclosure. In addition, the Act requires that change in ownership be filed electronically, rather than on paper as was done prior, and that the SEC post the filing on the internet within 1 business day after the filing is made.



TABLE 1
Summary of Securities Laws and Regulations

Rule 10b-5: Prohibits fraud, misstatements, or omission of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Section 13(d): Provides early warning to target firms of acquisitions of their stock by potential acquirers: 5% threshold, 10-day filing period. Applies to all large stock acquisitions.
Section 14(d) (1): Requirements of Section 13(d) extended to all public tender offers. Provides for full disclosure to SEC by any group making recommendations to target shareholders.
Section 14(d) (4)-(7): Regulates terms of tender offers: length of time offer must be held open (20 days), right of shareholders to withdraw tendered shares, and so on.
Section 14(e): Prohibits fraud and misrepresentation in context of tender offers. Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading on nonpublic information in tender offers.
Section 16(a): Provides for reporting by corporate insiders on their transactions in their corporations' stocks.
Section 16(b): Allows the corporation or its security holders to sue for return of profits on transactions by corporate insiders completed within a 6-month period.
Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984: Provides for triple damages in insider trading cases.
Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act
of 1970 (RICO): Provides for seizure of assets upon accusation and triple damages upon conviction for companies that defraud consumers, investors, and so on.

COURT CASES AND SEC RULES

To this point we have described the main statutory provisions that specify the various elements of fraud and insider trading in connection with trading in securities and takeover activities. The full meaning of these statutes is brought out by the subsequent court interpretations and SEC rules implementing the powers granted the SEC by the various statutes.

LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10B-5 OF THE 1934 ACT

As we have indicated, Rule 10b-5, issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the powers granted to it by the 1934 act, is a broad, powerful, and general securities antifraud provision. In general, for Rule 10b-5 to apply, a security must be involved. Technical issues have arisen regarding what constitutes a security. If securities are involved, all transactions are covered, whether on one of the securities exchanges or over the counter. A number of elements for a cause of action have been set forth in connection with Rule 10b-5, as follows.

1. There must be fraud, misrepresentation, a material omission, or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
2. The misrepresentation or omission must be of a fact as opposed to an opinion. However, inaccurate predictions of earnings may be held to be misrepresentations, and failure to disclose prospective developments may be challenged.
3. The misrepresentation or omission must be material to an investor's decision in the sense that there was a substantial likelihood that reasonable investors would consider the fact of significance in their decision.
4. There must be a showing that the plaintiff believed the misrepresentation and relied upon it and that it was a substantial factor in the decision to enter the transaction.
5. The plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or an actual seller to have standing.
6. Defendant's deception or fraud must have a sufficiently close nexus to the transaction so that a court could find that the defendant's fraud was "in connection with" the purchase or sale by plaintiff.
7. Plaintiff must prove that the defendant had scienter. Scienter literally means "knowingly or willfully." It means that the defendants had a degree of knowledge that makes the individual legally responsible for the consequences of their act and that they had an actual intent to deceive or defraud. Negligence is not sufficient.


These elements represent requirements for a successful suit under Rule 10b-5. Some of the elements were developed in a series of court decisions. The main thrust of Rule 10b-5 concerns fraud or deceit. The Supreme Court set forth the scienter requirement in two cases: Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185 (1976); and Aaron v. SEC,446 US 680 (1980).

In addition to its use in fraud or deceit cases, a number of interesting cases have brought out the meaning and applicability of Rule 10b-5 in connection with insider trading, For the present, we refer to insider trading merely as purchases or sales by persons who have access to information that is not available to those with whom they deal or to traders generally. However, many court decisions address what constitutes insider trading and a continual stream of proposals in Congress attempt to clarify the meaning of the term.

An early case was Cady, Roberts & Company, 40 SEC 907 (1961). In this case, a partner in a brokerage firm received a message from a director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation that the board of directors had voted to cut the dividend. The broker immediately placed orders to sell the Curtiss-Wright stock for some of his customers. The sales were made before news of the dividend cut was generally disseminated. The broker who made the transactions was held to have violated Rule 10b-5.



The Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation case of 1965 was classic [SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968)]. A vast mineral deposit consisting of millions of tons of copper, zinc, and silver was discovered in November 1963. However, far from publicizing the discovery, the company took great pains to conceal it for more than 5 months, to the extent of issuing a false press release In April 1964 labeling proliferating rumors as “unreliable… premature and possibly misleading." Meanwhile, certain directors, officers, Gulf Sulphur who knew of the find bought up quantities of the firm’s stock (and options on many more shares) before any public announcement. The false press release was followed only 4 days later by another that finally revealed publicly the extent of the find. In the company’s defense, it was alleged that secrecy was necessary to keep down the price of the neighboring tracts of land that they had to acquire in order to fully exploit the discovery. However, the SEC brought and won a civil suit based on Rule 10b-5.

The next case is Investors Management Company, 44 SEC 633 (1971). An aircraft manufacturer disclosed to a broker-dealer, acting as the lead underwriter for a proposed debenture issue, that its earnings for the current year would be much lower than it had previously publicly announced. This information was conveyed to the members of the sales department of the broker-dealer and passed on in turn to major institutional clients. The institutions sold large amounts of the stock before the earnings revisions were made public. Again, the SEC won the suit.

In the next two cases we cover, the SEC lost. The first case involved one of the leading investments banking corporations, Morgan Staley. The Kennecott Copper Corporation was analyzing whether or not to buy Olinkraft, a paper manufacturer. Morgan Stanley began negotiations with Olinkraft on behalf of Kennecott. Later Kennecott decided it did not wish to purchase Olinkraft. The knowledge that Morgan Stanley had gained in its negotiations led it to believe that one of its other clients, Johns-Manville, would find Olinkraft attractive. In anticipation of this possibility, Morgan Stanley bought large amounts of the common stock of Olinkraft. When Johns-Manville subsequently made a bid for Olinkraft, Morgan Stanley realized large profits. A suit was brought against Morgan Stanley. However, the court held that Morgan Stanley had not engaged in any improper behavior under Rule 10b-5.

In the next case, Raymond Dirks was a New York investment analyst who was informed by a former officer of Equity Funding of America that the company had been fraudulently overstating its income and net assets by large amounts. Dirks conducted his own investigation, which corroborated the information he had received. He told the SEC and a reporter at the Wall Street Journal to follow up on the situation and advised his clients to sell their Equity Funding shares. The SEC brought an action against Dirks on the grounds that if tippees have material information knowingly obtained from a corporate insider, they must either disclose it or refrain from trading. However, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Dirks had not engaged in improper behavior [Dirks v. SEC, 463 US 646 (1983)]. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the law made it clear that trading by insiders in shares of their own company using insider knowledge is definitely illegal. However, the court held that it was not illegal for Raymond Dirks to cause trades to be made on the basis of what he learned about Equity Funding because the officer who conveyed the information was not breaching any duty and Dirks did not pay for the information.

Therefore, the first principle is that it is illegal for insiders to trade on the basis of inside information. A second principle that has developed is that it is illegal for an outsider to trade on the basis of information that has been "misappropriated." The misappropriation doctrine began to develop in the famous Chiarella case [United States v. Chiarella 445 US 222 (1980)]. United States v. Chiarella was a criminal case. Vincent Chiarella was the "markup man " in the New York composing room of Pandick Press, one of the leading U.S. financial printing firms. In working on documents, he observed five announcements of corporate takeover bids in which the targets' identities had presumably been concealed by blank spaces and false names. However, Chiarella made some judgments about the names of the targets, bought their stock, and realized some profits. Chiarella was sued under Rule 10b-5 on the theory that, like the officers and directors of Texas Gulf Sulphur, he had defrauded the uninformed shareholders whose stock he had bought. Chiarella was convicted in the lower courts, and his case was appealed to the Supreme Court. In arguing its case before the Supreme Court, the government sought to strengthen its case. It argued that even if Chiarella did not defraud the persons with whom he traded, he had defrauded his employer, Pandick Press, and its clients, the acquiring firms in the documents he had read. He had misappropriated information that had belonged to Pandick Press and its clients. As a result, he had caused the price of the targets' stock to rise, thereby injuring his employer's clients and his employer's reputation for reliability. The Supreme Court expressed sympathy with the misappropriation theory but reversed Chiarella's conviction because the theory had not been used in the lower court.

However, in the next case that arose, the SEC used its misappropriation theory from the beginning and won in a criminal case. A stockbroker named Newman was informed by friends at Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb about prospective acquisitions. He bought the targets' shares and split the profits with his friends who had supplied the information. He was convicted under the misappropriation theory on grounds that he had defrauded the investment banking houses by injuring their reputation as safe repositories of confidential information from their clients. He had also defrauded their clients, because the stock purchases based on confidential information had pushed up the prices of the targets.

The misappropriation theory also won in a case similar to Chiarella. Materia was a proofreader at the Bowne Printing firm. Materia figured out the identity of four takeover targets and invested in them. This time the SEC applied the misappropriation theory from the start and won [SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d.197 (2d. Cir.1984)].

The SEC also employed the misappropriation theory in its criminal cast against a Wall Street Journal reporter, R. Foster Winans, the author of the newspaper's influential "Heard on the Street" column. Along with friends, Winans traded on the basis of what they knew would appear in the paper the following day. Although his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court, the 4-4 vote could not be mistaken for a resounding affirmation of the misappropriation doctrine, and some suspect that without the mail and wire fraud involved in the Winans case, the outcome might have been different. Rulings in later cases strengthened the misappropriation doctrine.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF STOCK EXCHANGES

In addition to the disclosure and notification requirements of federal and state securities regulation, the various national and regional stock exchanges have their own internal disclosure requirements for listed companies. In general, these amount to notifying 1he exchanges promptly (that is, by telephone) of any material developments that may significantly affect the trading volume and/or price of the listed firm's stock.

DISCLOSURE OF MERGER TALKS

On Apri1 4, 1988, the Supreme Court ruled by a 6-0 vote (three justices not participating) that investors may claim damages from a company that falsely denied it was involved in negotiations that resulted in a subsequent merger. Such denials would represent misleading information about a pending merger, which would provide investors who sold stock during the period with a basis for winning damages from the company officers.

The case involved the acquisition by Combustion Engineering of Basic Incorporated. Executives of Combustion Engineering began talks with Basic officers in 1976. The talks continued through 1977 and into early 1978, when Basic stock was selling for less than $20 per share. The stock began to rise in price, and in response to rumors of a merger, Basic issued three public statements denying that its officers knew of any reason for the rise in the price of its stock. It issued a denial as late as November 6, 1978.

REDULATION OF TAKEOVER ACTIVITY BY THE STATES

Before the Williams Act of 1968, virtually no state regulation of takeover activity existed. Even by 1974, only seven states had enacted statutes in this area. This is surprising became states are the primary regulators of corporate activity. The chartering of corporations takes place in individual states. State law has defined a corporation as a legal person subject to state laws. Corporate charters obtained from states define the powers of the firm and the rights and obligations of its shareholder, boards of directors, and managers. However, states are not permitted to pass laws that impose restrictions on interstate commerce or that conflict with federal laws that regulating interstate commerce.

Early state laws regulating hostile takeovers were declared illegal by the courts. For example, in 1982 the U.S. Supreme Court declared illegal an antitakeover law passed by the state of Illinois. The courts held that the Illinois law favored management over the interests of shareholders and bidders. The Illinois law also was found to impose impediments on interstate commerce and was therefore unconstitutional.




ISSUES WITH REGARD TO STATE TAKEOVER LAWS

One reason put forth for state takeover laws is that they permit shareholders a more considered response to two-tier and partial tender offers. The other argument is that the William Act provides that tender offers remain open for only 20 days. It is argued that a longer time period may be needed when the target is large to permit other bidders to develop information to decide whether or not to compete for the target.

However, in practice it has been found that 70% of the tender offers during the year 1981 to 1984 were for all outstanding shares. The other 30% of the offers were split between two-tier and partial offers. The proportion of two-tier offers declined over the period of the study (Office of the Chief Economist, SEC April 1985). Today, virtually all tender offers are outstanding shares.

Furthermore, many companies have adopted fair price amendments that require the bidder to pay a fair price for all shares acquired. Under the laws of Delaware, Massachuset, and certain other states, dissenting shareholders may request court appraisal of the value of their shares. To do so, however, they must file a written demand for appraisal before the shareholders meeting to vote on the merger. Tendering shareholders must not vote for the merger if they wish to preserve the right to an appraisal.

Critics also point out that state antitakeover laws have hurt shareholders. Studies by the Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC found that when New Jersey placed restrictions on takeovers in 1986, the prices for 87 affected companies fell by 11.5% (Bandow, 1988). Similarly, an SEC study found that stock prices for 74 companies chartered in Ohio declined an average of 3.2%, a $1.5 billion loss, after that state passed restrictive legislation. Another study estimated that the New York antitakeover rules reduced equity values by 1%, costing shareholders $1.2 billion (Bandow, 1988).

For these reasons, critics argue that the state laws protect parochial state interests rather than shareholders. They argues that the states act to protect employment and increase control over companies in local areas. Furthermore, they argue that state laws are not needed. If shareholder protection were needed, it could be accomplished by simply amending the Williams Act by extending the waiting period from 20 to 30 days, for example. It is argued further that that securities transactions clearly represent interstate commerce. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the state laws are not unconstitutional. By limiting securities transactions, they impede interstate commerce.

ANTITRUST POLICIES

When firms announce plans to merge, a great outcry often arises from consumer groups, suppliers, and other stakeholders that the merger will lead to less competition. Consequently, the U.S. government scrutinizes every merger in which the transaction value exceeds $50 million. In most cases, antitrust policy is handled by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Although the DOJ and the FTC have overlapping jurisdictions regarding antitrust policy, they generally coordinate the merger cases and decide which agency should handle each deal. In early 2002, they released plans to overhaul the merger review process whereby the DOJ would be responsible for mergers in certain industries, such as media and entertainment, and the FTC would be responsible for other industries, such as health care and auto manufacturing. The plan would eliminate duplicative efforts and eliminate 'potential conflict over which group is responsible for handling a specific merger. However, in May 2002, the DOJ and the FTC dropped their proposal due to threats from Senator Ernest Hollings (democrat, South Carolina) that he would cut the budgets of the respective agencies if they moved forward with the plan. Senator Hollings's objection was based on the argument that the Justice Department under President Bush would be less likely to challenge certain mergers, especially mergers in the media industry.

THE BASIC ANTITRUST STATUTES

The two basic antitrust laws are the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.

SHERMAN ACT OF 1890

This law was passed in response to the heightened merger activity around the turn of the century. It contains two sections. Section 1 prohibits mergers that would tend to create a monopoly or undue market control. This was the basis on which the FTC stopped the merger between Staples and Office Depot in 1997. This merger would have combined two of the top three office supply superstore chains in the United States. These two chains competed in numerous metropolitan areas and in some cases were the only two superstore competitors. The key issue in the case was defining the relevant product market. The FTC held that the relevant market for office supplies was "office supply superstores." Because only one other major superstore existed, namely Office Max, this definition eliminated any potential competition that could arise from nonsuperstores, Internet, fax, mail order, warehouse clubs, and so forth. As evidence, the FTC used internal documents obtained from the merging parties, which suggested that raising prices was easier in the markets with only two superstores as opposed to three. Section 2 is directed against firms that already had become dominant in their markets in the view of the government. This was the basis for actions against IBM and AT &T in the 1950s. Both firms were required to sign consent decrees in 1956 restricting AT&T from specified markets and requiring that IBM sell as well as lease computer equipment. Under Section 2, IBM and AT&T were sued again in the 1970s. The suit against IBM, which had gone on for 10 years, was dropped in 1983. The suit against AT&T resulted in divestiture of the operating companies, effective in 1984.


A recent landmark Section 2 case is United Stares v. Microsoft. The Microsoft case dates back to 1990 when the FTC opened an antitrust investigation to see whether Microsoft’s pricing policies illegally thwarted competition and whether Microsoft had written its operating system source code to hinder competing applications. Throughout the 1990s, Microsoft was continually. Involved in litigation with the FTC, the DOJ, and various state governments regarding the antitrust allegations. At one juncture in 2000, a federal court issued a judgment requiring Microsoft to split the company into an operating systems business and an applications business. This judgment eventually was reversed on appeal, and in late 2001 Microsoft reached a settlement with the U.S. government. Under the consent decree, Microsoft agreed to restrictions on how it develops and licenses software, works with independent software providers, and communicates about its software with competitors and partners. Microsoft had not cleared all suits from some individual states as of March 4,2003. Possible action by the EU has also been rumored.

CLAYTON ACT OF 1914

The Clayton Act created the Federal Trade Commission for the purpose of regulating the behavior of business firms. Among its sections two are of particular interest. Section gives the FTC power to prevent firms from engaging in harmful business practices. Section 7 involves mergers. As enacted in 1914, Section 7 made it illegal for a company to acquire the stock of another company if competition could be adversely affected. Companies made asset acquisitions to avoid the prohibition against acquiring stock. The 1950 amendment gave the FTC the power to block asset purchases as well as stock purchases. The amendment also added an incipiency doctrine The FTC can block mergers if it perceives a tendency toward increased concentration - meaning the share of industry sales of the largest firms appears to be increasing

HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT OF 1970

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (HSR) consists of three major parts. Its objective was to strengthen the powers of the DOJ and the FFC by requiring approval before a merger could take place Before HSR, antitrust actions usually were taken after completion of a transaction. By the time a cart decision was made, the merged firms had been operating for several years, so it was difficult to “unscramble the omelet.”

Under Title I, the DOJ has the power to issue civil investigative demands in an antitrust investigation. The idea, here is that if the DOJ suspects a firm of antitrust violations, it can require firms to provide internal records that can be searched for evidence. We have seen cases in which firms were required to provide literally boxcar loads of internal files for review by the DOJ under Title 1.

Title II is a premerger notification provision, Title acquiring firm has sales or assets of $100 million or more and the target firm has sales or assets of 15 million or more, or vice versa, information must be submitted for review. Before the takeover can be completed, a 30-day waiting period for mergers (15 days for tender offers) is required to enable the agencies to ender an opinion legality. Either agency may request a 20-day extension of the waiting period for mergers or a 10-day extension for tender often.

Title III is the Parens Patriac Act - each state is the parent or protector of Consumers and competitors. It expands the powers of state attorneys general to initiate triple-damage suits on behalf of persons (in their states) injured by violations of the antitrust laws. The state itself does not need to be injured by the violation. This gives the individual states the incentive to increase the budgets of their stale attorneys general. A successful suit with triple damages can augment the revenues of the states. In the Microsoft case, the attorneys general of 22 states joined in the suit filed by the DOJ.

The pre-notification required by Title II is an important part of the merger process. For example, in 2000, out of 9,566 merger announcements filings were required for 4,926 transactions. This implies that 51% of total transactions involved targets with total assets in excess of $15 million; the other 49% were relatively small deals. About 71% of the filings were reviewed and permitted to proceed before the end of the statutory 30-day waiting period. About 16% (809) of the transactions were assigned to either the DOJ or the FTC for further substantive review of the 809, the DOJ or the FTC issued “second requests” for 98 of the submissions. A second request is traumatic for applicants because onerous investigations may result. Furthermore, of the 80 second-request cases in 1998,54 resulted in formal actions taken against the merger and 26 in abandonments.

The legal literature and our own experience suggest actions by the parties to a merger that may improve the odds of approval by the review authorities. Companies should follow a proactive strategy during the 30-day review period. The HSR process should be viewed as an educational endeavor to provide the necessary information to the government staff attorneys. The staff attorneys should be contacted with an offer to provide additional information voluntarily. A briefing package should fully develop the business reasons for the merger. Under the guidance of attorneys, high-level business executives should be made available for informal presentations or staff interviews.

In response to-a second request, the companies should start with a rolling production of material. Two copies of the organization charts for both companies should be provided, with the second copy annotated with names of care groups of employees identified as sources of information. Relevant documents identified in discussions with staff should be offered promptly.

The overriding approach should be for the lawyers and executives to convey a factual, logical story, emphasizing the industry dynamics that make the transaction imperative for the preservation of the client as a viable entity for providing high-quality products to its customers at fair prices. The presentation should demonstrate how the industry dynamics require the transaction to enable the firm to fulfill its responsibilities to consumers, employees, the communities in which it has its plants and offices, and its owners and creditors.

THE ANTITRUST GUIDELINES

In the merger guidelines of 1982, and successively in 1987, 1992 and 1996, the spirit of the regulatory authorities was altered. In the merger guidelines of 1968, concentration tests were applied somewhat mechanically. With the recognition of the internationalization of competition and other economic realities, the courts and the antitrust agencies began to be less rigid in their approach to antitrust. In addition to the concentration measures, the economics of the industry were taken into account. For example, in its July 8, 1995, issue, the Economist had a lead article entitled, “How Dangerous Is Microsoft?” (pp. 13—14). In an article on antitrust in the same issue, the Economist commented that Microsoft held 80% of its market but advised that the trustbusters should analyze the economics of the industry.

The guidelines sought to assure business firms that the older antitrust rules that emphasize various measures of concentration would be replaced by consideration of the realities of the marketplace. Nevertheless, the guidelines start with measures of concentration. For many years, the antitrust authorities, following the academic literature, looked at the share of sales or value added by the top four firms. If this share exceeded 20% (in some cases even lower), it might trigger an antitrust investigation.

Beginning in the 1982 guidelines, the quantitative test shifted to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hill), which is a concentration measure based on the market shares of all firms in the industry. It is simply the sum of the s4uares of market shares of each firm in the industry. For example; if there were 10 firms in the industry and each held a 10% market share, the HHI would be 1000. If one firm held a 90% market share and the nine others held a 1% market share, the HHI would be 8,109 (902 + 9 x 1). Notice how having a dominant firm greatly increases the HHI. The HHI is applied as indicated by Table 2.

A merger in an industry with a resulting HHI of less than 1,000 is unlikely to be investigated or challenged by the antitrust authorities. An HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 represents moderate concentration. Investigation and challenge depend on the amount by which the HHI increased over its premerger level. An increase of 100 or more may invite an investigation. An industry with postmerger HHI higher than 1,800 is considered a concentrated market. Even a moderate increase over the premerger HHI is likely to result in an investigation by the antitrust authorities.

But, beginning in 1982, the guidelines already had recognized the role of market characteristics. Particularly important is the ability of existing and potential competitors to expand the supply of a product if one firm tries to restrict output. On the demand side, it is recognized that close substitutes usually can be found for any product, so a high market share of the sales of one product does not give the ability to elevate price. Quality differences, the introduction of new products, and technologies change result in product proliferation and close substitutes. The result is usually fluctuating market shares. For these reasons, concentration measures alone are not a reliable guide to measure the competitiveness of an industry.

OTHER MARKET CHARACTERISTICS

Most important is whether entry is easy or difficult. If output can be increased by expansion of non-cooperating firms already in the market or if new firms can construct new facilities or convert existing ones, an effort by some firms to increase price would not be profitable. The expansion of supply would drive prices down. Conditions of entry or other supply expansion potentials determine whether firms can collude successfully regardless of market structure numbers.
Table 2
Critical Concentration Levels

Postmerger HHI Antitrust Challenge to a Merger?
Less than 1.0 No challenge —industry is unconcentrated.
Between 1,000 and 1,800 If HHI increased by 100, investigate.
More than 1,800 If HHI increased by 50, challenge.

Next considered is the ease and profitability of collusion, because it is less likely that firms will attempt to coordinate price increases if collusion is difficult or impossible. Here the factors to consider are product differences (heterogeneity), frequent quality changes, frequent new products, technological changes, contracts that involve complicated terms in addition to price, cost differences among suppliers, and so on. Also, the DOJ challenges are more likely when firms in an industry have co in the past or use practices such as exchanging price or output information.

NONHORIZONTAL MERGERS

The guidelines also include consideration of non-horizontal mergers. Non-horizontal mergers include vertical and conglomerate mergers. The guidelines express the view that although non-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, “they are not invariably innocuous.” The principal theories under which non-horizontal mergers are like to be challenged are then set forth. Concern is expressed over the elimination of potential entrants by non-horizontal mergers. The degree of concern is greatly influenced by whether conditions of entry generally are easy or difficult. If entry is easy, effects on potential entrants are likely to be small. If entry is difficult, the merger will be examined more closely.

The guidelines set forth three circumstances under which vertical mergers may facilitate collusion and therefore be objectionable (1) If upstream firms obtain a high level of vertical integration into an associated retail market, tins may facilitate collusion m the upstream market by monitoring retail prices. (2) The elimination by vertical merger of a disruptive buy in a downstream market may facilitate collusion in the upstream market. (3) Non-horizontal mergers by monopoly public utilities may be used to evade rate regulation.

PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS

The attitudes of business competitors have always had a strong influence on antitrust policy. Writers have pointed out that even when government was responsible for most antitrust actions, the investigations usually followed complaints that were lodged by competitors against the behavior of other firms that were making life difficult for them in the marketplace (Ellert, 1975, 1976).

It also is argued that the private lawsuit has always been a temptation to lawyers. The cost of litigation is so high that the threat of a private lawsuit can sometimes be used as blackmail to pressure the prospective defendant to make a cash settlement (Grundman, 1987). Some basic statistics on private antitrust cases were developed under the auspices of the Georgetown Law School (Pitofsky, 1987; White, 1988). Most private antitrust cases are Sherman Act cases in which plaintiffs challenge cartel behavior. The average private, triple-damage case takes about 1.5 years to complete compared with 9 months for the average civil case, including relatively minor court cases. The median award in private antitrust cases is $154,000 about the same as the median award in civil litigation.

STATE ANTITRUST ACTIVITY

Another development said to be stimulated by the changed policies of the federal antitrust agencies has been an increase in state activity. The arguments here also are complex and require careful analysis. In the first place; the increased power of the states was granted in the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act of 1976 described earlier in this chapter. This was 4 years before antitrust policies by the federal agencies began to change in 1980. In addition, the federal government gave $10 million to the states to increase their antitrust enforcement efforts under HSR. The Department of Justice reported that during the rant period, the number of state actions increased from 206 in 1977 to more than 400 in 1919 (Ewing, 1987). Again, all of this increase in activity was before the change in policies by the federal antitrust agencies after 1980.

The activity of the states has been increasing. The state attorneys general have formed the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), which has published merger and vertical restraint guidelines. In addition, it is developing a legislative program to change by statute the content of the federal antitrust laws.

Although the state attorneys general have been cooperating, it is potentially chaotic to have 50 different antitrust laws to which business operations may be subject. Cooperation between the state attorneys general may mitigate this problem, but some risk remains. Whenever jobs are threatened in any locality either by the functioning of active free markets or by merger activity, a risk exists, that parochial views will prevail over what is best for the national economy (Ewing, 1987).

REGULATORY BODIES

Several industries in the United Slates remain subject to regulation. Generally, regulated industries are still subject to antitrust review, requiring cooperation between the regulatory bodies involved. Our summary coverage will be limited to railroads, commercial banking, and telecommunications.

RAILROADS

The interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) established in 1887, had long regulated the rail-road industry. Under the ICC Termination Act of 1995, it was replaced by the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The STB has final authority on antitrust matters but must file notices with the Justice Department, which may file objections at STB hearings. Among the tests the STB is required to consider are (1) the effect on adequacy of transportation, (2) the effect on competition among rail carriers, and (3) the interests of rail carrier employees affected by the proposed transaction.

The Department of Justice strongly opposed the Un4on Pacific – Southern Pacific merger, but, after gaining the approval of the STB, the deal was completed in 1996. In October 1996, CSX offered $2.50 in cash for 40% of Conrail and stock for the remaining 60% Norfolk Soutbexn Railroad shortly made an all-cash offer of $100 per share. A bidding war ensued. coupled with legal skirmishes. The STB urged the participants to negotiate an agreement in which two balanced east-west lines would be created. In the resulting compromise, CSX acquired what was the old New York Central Railroad, and Norfolk Southern acquired the old Pennsylvania Railroad system. The two examples demonstrate the strong role of the STB.

COMMERCIAL BANKS

Ranking is another industry subject to regulation. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED) has broad powers over economic matters as well as antitrust. With regard to bank mergers, three agencies may be involved. The Comptroller of the Currency has jurisdiction when national banks are involved. The FED makes decisions for state banks are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reviews mergers for state-chartered banks that are not members of the FED but are insured by the FDIC. In conducting its reviews, each agency takes into account a review provided by the Department of justice.

Bank mergers have long been subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914. Modifications were enacted by the Bank Merger Act of 1966. Past bank mergers were legalized. Any merger approved by one of the three regulatory agencies had fly he challenged within 30 days by the Attorney General. The Act of 1966 provided that anticompetitive effects could be out weighed by a finding that the transaction served the “convenience and needs” of the community to be served. The convenience and needs defense is not applicable to the acquisition banks of non-banking businesses. The review by one of the three agencies substitutes for under Hart-Scott-Rodino of 1976.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has primary responsibility for the radio and television industries. Mergers in these areas are subject to approval by the FCC which defers to the Department of Justice and the FFC on antitrust aspects. The Federal communications of 1996 provided for partial deregulation of the telephone and related industries, with rather complicated provisions affecting the role of the former operating companies of the Bell System with their relatively strong monopoly positions in their regional markets.


INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

Most of the developed countries of the world have some form of merger control. Cross-border transactions will be subject to the multiple jurisdictions of the borne countries of bidders and targets. At the end of February 2000, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee released its 2-year study. It recommended that the more ‘than 80 nations conducting antitrust enforcement make more explicit what their antitrust policies are. They proposed faster approval of transactions that do not present obvious problems. They recommended that the U.S. “second-request” process, in which the U.S. antitrust agencies ask for more information about a merger, should be streamlined. The report noted that about half of the mergers reviewed by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission or Justice Department have an international component.

Although variations in statutes administrative bodies and procedures are observed, a central theme is market share percentages. The advisory committee report recommended that the merger-size threshold be raised to reduce the number of reviews It also recommended more definite time lines for the review process be established. However, antitrust authorities may even take action when a purely foreign transaction is perceived to have an impact in domestic markets.

CANADA

The Competition Act of 1976, amended in 1991 and 2002 is a federal statute that governs all aspects of Canadian competition. Unlike the United States, where merging parties deal with separate agencies such as the SEC and the FTC the Competition Bureau provides one-stop shopping for the review and control of all merger. Waiting periods for merger approval range from 2 weeks for the straightforward cases to 6 weeks for more complicated cases and upto 5 months for complex cases. Mergers generally will not be challenged on the basis of concerns relating to the exercise of market power where the post-merger market share of the merged entity would be less than 35%.

UNITED KINGDOM

The Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965 created the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) (Gray and McDenuott, 1989). A new era in merger control was established by the Fair Trading Act of 1973 in the United Kingdom (UK). The ad created an Office of Fair trading (OFT) headed by a director general (DG). The DG of the OFT is required to review all mergers in which the combined firm would have a 25% market share or where the assets of the target exceed 30 million British pounds. Alter review by the OFT, its DG advises the secretary of state for trade and industry whether a referral should be made to the MMC. The secretary of state has discretion whether or not to make the referral. If a referral is made to the MMC, the current bid lapses but may be renewed if the MMC approves. The MMC review may take as long as 6 months. Its report is made to the OFT and the secretary of state. If the MMC recommends approval, the secretary of state cannot override. However, if the MMC recommends prohibition, the secretary of state is not required to accept its findings, but such instances are rare. As a practical matter, a referral to the MMC, which lapses the current bid and involves along time lag, is likely to kill the transaction. In 1999 its name was changed to the Competition Commission.

JAPAN

Immediately after the conclusion of World War II, the United States attempted to reduce the role of Japanese business groups (keiretsu). Also, a proposed merger requires a filing with a Japanese FTC. The government has 30 days to review the antitrust implications and can extend the review period another 60 days. However, in a stock-for-stock transaction, approval by the government is not required. The reasoning is that advanced review is not needed in a stock transaction, which is more easily reversed. The government can, however, still make an antitrust challenge within 90 days after the transaction.

As in the United States, the review focuses on market share. A combined market share below 25% is not likely to be challenged. A market share above the critical level is likely to be reviewed. The government is probably more flexible in reaching a compromise with the merging companies than are the U.S. antitrust agencies.

EUROPE

The European Union (EU) Merger Regulation grants the European Commission (EC) exclusive authority to review the antitrust implications of transactions that affect the economy of the European Community Transactions have a community impact if total sales of the combined firm are greater than $4.5 billion annually and the EU sales of each party are greater than $250 million. However, if two thirds of the revenues of each firm are achieved in a single EU country, the EC will defer to that country’s antitrust authorities.

Premerger notification is required. The minister of competition of the EU requires a 3-week waiting period but can extend it. The commission is required to decide upon further investigation within the waiting period and must render an approval decision within 5 months. The critical issue is whether the combination will create or strengthen a dominant position.

A dramatic example of the international reach of the EU competition policy is provided by the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, announced m December 1996-US defense procurement outlays between 1988 and 1996 had declined by more than 50%. A series of consolidating mergers had taken place among U.S. defense contractor. The EU competition commissioner was concerned that Boeing’s position in the commercial aviation market would be further strengthened. However, the main concern was Boeing’s aggressive program of signing exclusive purchase contracts with major U.S. airlines that would have made it more difficult for Airbus to increase its share of the US commercial aviation market. On May 21, 1997, the EU issued its objections, requiring concessions to avoid its stopping the transaction. The EU had the authority to impose substantial fines, including the seizure of Boeing planes in Europe. Boeing made the requisite concessions to obtain approval from the EU competition commissioner. This case illustrates the potentially far reach of international antitrust to a merger between two US firms.

Another example of the international reach of the EU involves the General Electric and Honeywell merger announced in October 2000. When this deal was announced, analysts believed that the DOJ and the FTC would likely issue an HSR second request due to potential concerns about segment concentration and pricing power, especially in the aircraft engine segment. The view held at the time would be that perhaps some divestitures would be required, but the merger would be permitted to go through. A second request was issued, but the DOJ formally approved the merger in May 2001, with some minimal conditions such as requiring General Electric to divest a military helicopter engine unit and let a new company service some of Honeywell’s small commercial jet engines.

Whereas analysts and the merging parties had expected some resistance from the DOJ and the FFC, they exhibited little concern regarding the EU. After all, the EU had never blocked a U.S.-based merger that had received the prior approval of the DOJ or the FTC. Indeed, Jack Welch, chairman and CEO of General Electric, believed that the deal would easily obtain EU approval. General Electric waited until early February 2001 before formally filing for EU approval. They delayed the EU filing until well after the United States in order to learn something from the US experience so as to make any necessary adjustments to the EU filing. Even though they filed relatively late, representatives of the merging parties had spent considerable time in Brussels engaged in discussions with the EU staff in preparation for the filing. The goal was to get it right the first time and obtain approval without any waiting period. However, in March of 2001, the EU announced a formal second-stage review, which is similar to the HSR second review. The second-stage review can last up to 4 months. The primary issue was with General Electric’s aircraft-engines business. The EU was concerned that with the addition of Honeywell, General Electric would be able to bundle various product packages, and thus have the ability to hurt its competitors and to increase its price to consumers As a result of this possibility, Rolls Royce and Airbus Industries, two European aircraft-engine manufacturers, lobbied heavily to prevent the merger. General Electric continued to remain optimistic that the merger would go through. In late May, Jack Welch indicated that he did not foresee major hurdles to completing the deal. Nonetheless, in early July, the EU formally voted against the merger as it believed the merger would create dominant positions in several areas including the markets for avionics and jet engines.

The EU decisions with respect to the General Electric Honeywell merger resulted in great criticism from numerous groups in the United States, including analysts on Wall Street politicians in Washington. D.C., and business leaders throughout the country. The perception was that the EU’s dominance test as applied in-the Honeywell merger would result in too many rejections of mergers. Moreover, many hold the view that the dominance test tends to benefit competitors, and in the case of the General Electric and Honeywell merger, tends to benefit Rolls Royce and Airbus Industries. The EU has rejected this notion, indicating that if a merger results in cheaper or better services to the customer base, then it would consider allowing a merger even if it meant a reduction in competition. In the case of General Electric and Honeywell the EU did not foresee any obvious benefits to the customer. It is our view that in most cases, regulators in the United States and in Europe tend to agree on basic principles of antitrust enforcement, but the occasional substantive divergence of opinion does occur.

REGULATION BY PUBLICITY

Three in-depth studies [DeAngelo, and Gilson (DDG), 1994 1996; DeAngelo and DeAngelo (DO), 1998] document some propositions developed by Michael Jensen on the politics of finance (Jensen, 1979, 1991, 1993).

SEIZURE OF THE FIRST EXECUTIVE CORPORATION AND FIRST CAPITAL LIFE

In their 1994 study, DDG described the experience of the First Executive Corporation (FE) and its main subsidiary. The Executive Life Insurance Company (ELK). In 1974, Fred Cart took over as chief executive officer of FE. Under his direction, ELIC’s total assets grew from 355th in rank to 15th in 1988 Measured by insurance in force, FE grew from $700 million in 1974 to $60 billion in 1989.

This spectacular growth came from two major sources. One was innovative products such as single-premium deferred annuities. Another important innovation was interest-sensitive whole life products that put competitive pressure on traditional insurers locked into long-term and low-risk assets with low returns. On the management side, FE and ELIC followed some innovative cost reduction methods. The other major competitive advantage developed was to invest in higher-yielding junk bonds, which grew to 65% of the assets of EUC Until January 1990, ELIC enjoyed a AAA rating from Standard & Poor’s with comparable ratings from Moody’s and A. M. Best.

Can was a tough competitor. His letters to stockholders criticized his competitors for their stodginess and refusal to mark assets to market values. The aggressive behavior by Carr was especially inflammatory because it was accompanied by a substantial increase in market share.

In 1989, when Milken and the Drexel Company became the target of regulatory and legal actions, the junk bond market in its entirety was unfavorably impacted. In 1989, the congressional enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIR REA) essentially forced the savings and loans (S&Ls) to dispose of their junk bonds and caused the junk bond market to collapse. Although Can bad been calling for “mark-to market” accounting in his letters to shareholders for many years, the timing of the enactment of the legislation made what otherwise might have been a minor adjustment a major collapse.

ELICs competitors publicized these adverse developments and encouraged the policyholders of FE and ELIC to cash m their policies, resulting in the equivalent of a bank run. The financial press ran numerous feature articles dramatizing the difficulties of FE. This adverse publicity gave John Garamendi, the insurance commissioner of California, a basis for placing ELIC in conservatorship on April 11, 1991. This seizure caused further policy surrender request. Ultimately, in March 1992, California regulators sold $6.13 billions (par value) of ELIC’s junk bonds for $3.25 billions; this was at least $2 billion below their then-current value.

Ironically, the more traditional insurers experienced declines in their real estate portfolios that were 23 times the decline in junk bonds. Furthermore, although junk bonds, real estate, and mortgages bottomed out toward the end of 1990, the value of junk bonds increased in value by almost 60% by July 1992, but real estate and mortgages had recovered by less than 20%. Without regulatory intervention, FE and ELK would have been fully solvent within a year and a half after the junk bond market bottomed out. Insurance companies and S&Ls with heavy investments in real estate and mortgages experienced continued difficulties.

The story of First Capital Life is similar (DDG 1996). The seizure of That Capital Life and its parent First Capital Holdings was related to the investment of 40% of its portfolio in junk bonds. DDG state that their evidence suggests that regulatory seizure reflected the targeting of insurers that had invested in junk bonds. However, these companies did not experience differentially poorer financial positions compared with other insurers.

THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OR THE PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY

In 1986, the Pacific Lumber Company (It), the largest private owner of old redwood trees, was acquired in a leveraged hostile takeover by the MAXXAM Group headed by Charles Hurwitz, regarded as a corporate raider. The event resulted in a dramatic barrage of negative media coverage linking junk bonds and takeover greed to the destruction of the redwoods.

In their careful analysis of the facts, DD (1998) reach a more balanced conclusion. They point out that basic limber economics explains the behavior of MAXXAM and the predecessor owners of PL. Timber economics predict that old growth forests will be harvested first because they will yield virtually no further growth in harvestable limber volume, limber economic principles predict that under any private ownerships, old growth forests will be harvested, a process that had been taking place for at least 100 years before the 1986 takeover of FL. Theft study presents evidence that shows that 91% of PL’s old growth redwoods had already been logged by the time of the takeover and that the old and new managements had similar timetables for the remaining acreage. Junk bonds and takeovers would have little effect on these timetables. DD outline the correct policies for saving the redwoods. One is to raise hinds to purchase the old growth acreage for public holding. The other is to raise funds to purchase previously logged land to grow new redwood forests. These eminently sensible prescriptions were lost in the hysteria over the change of ownership of the Pacific Lumber Company.

REGULATION BY THE POLITICS OF FINANCE

The clinical studies of ELIC, First Capital Life, and PL illustrate how the use of junk bonds resulted in regulation by the politics of finance, The ultimate explanation for the bad reputation of junk bonds is that potentially they could finance the takeover of any firm that was not per forming up to its potential. Thus, junk bonds became a vigilant monitoring instrument to pressure managements to achieve a high level of efficiency in the companies under their steward ship. The junk bond takeover threat was unsettling to the managers of the leading companies in the United States. Widespread animosity toward the use of junk bonds developed. Junk bonds filled an important financing gap for new and risky growth companies. Their use in takeovers led to value enhancement for shareholders. However, these three studies illustrate how junk bond use became a lightning rod for widespread hysteria, animosity, and pressures on government regulations to limit and penalize their use.